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Comity and the International Application
of the Sherman Acte Encouraging the
Courts to Enter the Political Arena
Steven A. Kadish *
Zn this article, Mr. Kadish discusses the comity anaysis of Timberlane
Lumber Company v. Bank of America, and examines what it involves,
what is accomplishes, whether it isjustifed, and whether there are preferable
alternatives to it. He concludes that the Timberlane analysis should be re-
jected, or at least limited because its use to determine United States' court
jurisdiction is at best questionable, because it violates traditional abstention
doctrine and current Supreme Court and Congressional treatment offor-
eigners' activities, because there may be insurmountable practical difficulties
in applying the analysis, and because the analysis encourages courts to enter
the political arena.
INTRODUCTION
The application of the Sherman Act's foreign commerce provision'
has stimulated debate among commentators and practitioners,2 and has
* Associate, Levy & Erens, Chicago, Illinois. This article was originally prepared for the
Northwestern Univet ty School of Law Senior Research Program. The author wishes to express
his respect for and appreciation to Professor James Rahl for the many hours which he devoted to
challenging and focusing the analysis presented in this article.
1 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act state, in pertinent part:
[§ 1] Every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
[§ 2] Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor ....
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
2 K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958); W. FUGATE, FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979); J. RAHL, COMMON
MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST chs. 2,4 (1970); PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J.P. Griffin ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
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created friction between the United States and many of its historic al-
lies.3 Judge Learned Hand's pronouncement in Alcoa 4 that the Sher-
man Act embraces actions taken by foreigners wholly within a foreign
country if these actions were intended to affect, and did affect, the im-
port or export commerce of the United States5 has contributed greatly
to the extraterritorial fireworks.6 Until 1976, Alcoa's "intended ef-
fects" test, relating to foreign defendants acting totally within a foreign
country, and the "effects" test, relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction in
general,7 remained the standards defining the scope of the Sherman
Act's subject matter jurisdiction in foreign commerce cases.8
In 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
speaking through Judge Choy in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 9 announced a new approach to extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act. The Timberlane Company and two of its Honduran
subsidiaries, Danli Industrial and Maya Lumber, alleged that the Bank
of America and other defendants had violated the Sherman Act and
the Wilson Tariff Act. The defendants had allegedly conspired to pre-
vent Timberlane from milling lumber in Honduras, thereby preventing
Timberlane from importing this lumber into the United States. The
defendants had tied up the assets of Timberlane's subsidiaries by en-
PERSPECTIVES]; Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialAntitrust Violations-Paths Through
the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519 (1971); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos" Con-
structing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw.
U.L. REv. 733 (1977); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations. What is Covered?, 8 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
3 See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 365-72 (2d ed.
1970); PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2; Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada and the
United States in the Mid-1970's, I 1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165 (1978); Gordon, ExtraterritorialAppli-
cation of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980); Stan-
ford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View From
Abroad, II CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
4 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit sitting as a special court of last resort because of the inability to achieve a
quorum in the United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa].
5 Id. at 443-44.
6 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 9-10.
7 See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal.
1971), afd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (direct or
substantial effect); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
("a conspiracy ... which affects American commerce"); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), mod#fledandaj'd., 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ("a direct and
influencing effect on trade"). See also I J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REG-
ULATION § 5.02[21, at 5-120 (1969 & Supp. 1981).
8 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 26; Fortenberry, supra note 2, at 528. For a detailed discussion of
the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act, see W. FUGATE, supra note 2, at 29-87; J. RAHL,
supra note 2, at 50-89.
9 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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forcing claims which had arisen against these companies' predecessor.
Even though Maya made a substantial cash offer to buy these security
interest claims, the Bank of America refused to sell and ultimately
transferred these claims, for "questionable consideration," to a "front
man" who used the Honduran judicial processes to paralyze
Timberlane's business.'" In his analysis of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Act, Judge Choy expanded upon 41coa to include
explicit analysis of considerations of comity and fairness before juris-
diction could be exercised."
The Timberlane test has been accepted or commented upon favor-
ably by many sources, including the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit,' 2 two United States District Courts,' 3 the former
head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division,' 4 and the Antitrust
Guide for International Operations.'5 Unfortunately, all of these
sources embrace Timberlane without any meaningful analysis as to
what the test involves; whether such a test is justified; what, if anything,
the test accomplishes; and whether there are alternatives preferable to
the Timberlane formulation. This article hopes to fill these analytical
gaps.
COMITY: DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL MEANING
The concept of comity is entwined with notions of mutual consid-
eration and respect. Comity has been defined as "courtesy; complai-
sance; respect; a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of
right, but out of deference and good will."' 6 Comity has also been con-
sidered to be "kindly, courteous behavior; friendly civility; mutual con-
sideration between or as if equals.""'
More significantly, judicial pronouncements' 8 and legal commen-
10 Id. at 603-05.
1 Id. at 613.
12 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
13 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
14 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 22-24 (remarks of John H. Shenefield, then Assistant Attor-
ney General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division).
15 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPER-
ATIONS 6-7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE GUIDE].
16 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968).
17 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966).
18 Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409 (1964); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 518, 588-91 (1839); Second Russian Ins.
Co. v. Miller, 297 F. 404, 409 (2d Cir. 1924); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v.
Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 259, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923); People v. Rushworth, 294 II. 455, 463, 128
N.E. 555, 558 (1920).
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tary19 concerning comity focus not only on notions of respect, but also
on comity's nonmandatory character and the view that a court should
not exercise comity if doing so would be contrary to its own nation's
interests or policies. In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,2°
Joseph Story remarked on the discretionary nature of comity:
[A]ssuming that such a moral duty [to exercise comity] does exist, it is
clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity,
and charity. Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of
the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its exer-
cise may be justly demanded.21
The Supreme Court reinforced these notions in Bank ofAugusta v.
Earle,22 an action contesting a bill of exchange. When discussing
whether a corporation established in one state should be given legal
existence in a foreign state, Justice Taney, speaking for the Court,
stated:
The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sover-
eignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is
inadmissible when contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its inter-
ests .... It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation,
which is administered. .... 23
In Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario ,24 Judge
Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals addressed the limitation
on the exercise of comity by the courts, particularly with regard to for-
eign relations:
This rule [of comity] is always subject, however, to one consideration.
There may be no yielding [to comity], if to yield is inconsistent with our
public policy .... Such public policy may be interpreted by the courts.
It is fixed by general usage and morality or by executive or legislative
declaration. Especially is the definition of our relations to foreign nations
confided not to the courts, but to another branch of government. That
branch determines our policy toward them. It only remains for the courts
to enforce it.
25
Comity, as historically defined and applied and as indicated by the
above cases and commentary is, therefore, governed by three factors:
(1) respect, (2) mutual consideration, and (3) discretionary application
such that comity will not be invoked if doing so would give rise to a
result contrary to the nation's interests or policy.
19 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 32-39 (8th ed. 1883).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 32.
22 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 518 (1839).
23 Id. at 589.
24 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
25 Id. at 259.
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DEALING WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PRESENCE
Prior to Timberlane's addition of comity to the extraterritorial pic-
ture, American courts relied on the doctrines of foreign sovereign im-
munity,26 act of state,27 and foreign sovereign compulsion 28 to deal
with foreign government interests affected by the application of the
Sherman Act. Although both foreign sovereign immunity and the act
of state can be justified on the grounds of comity and respect for the
foreign sovereign, the courts and Congress have moved away from the
comity rationale as justification for these doctrines.29 The doctrine of
foreign sovereign compulsion could also be based on a comity founda-
tion, but the courts instead have based the doctrine on fairness to the
litigant rather than on respect for the foreign sovereign. 30  Conse-
quently, Judge Choy introduced comity into questions of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction even though other doctrines dealing with foreign
government presence, which arguably could be based on comity, do not
rely on this concept. Nonetheless, comity can be better understood af-
ter these other doctrines have been discussed.
Sovereign Immunity
Historically, sovereign immunity was a judicially derived doctrine
of indefinite scope.3 At its broadest, the traditional doctrine provided
immunity for foreign states regardless of the character of the activity on
which the cause of action was based.3 2 By contrast, the alternative re-
strictive theory limited immunity only to those actions in which the
sovereign acted in its governmental capacity, as distinct from those ac-
tivities where the government acted as a commercial participant.33 In
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,3 4 the United States Supreme Court
limited the judiciary's discretion as to which theory of immunity to ap-
ply when it held that the courts should rely on the State Department's
determination of whether immunity should be granted.3 5 The Court
26 See infra text accompanying notes 31-48.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 58-66.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 35-48 and 51-56.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 59-66.
31 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 178. For a general discussion of sovereign immunity, see W.
FUGATE, supra note 2, at 111-14; B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 178-86.
32 See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Oliver Am.
Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659, 663-65 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925); B.
HAWK, supra note 2, at 178-79.
33 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 179.
34 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
35 Id. at 35-36.
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grounded its holding on the premise that sovereign immunity devel-
oped because of the judiciary's reluctance to intrude on the executive
branch's conduct of foreign affairs, rather than out of respect for the
foreign sovereign.36 Consequently, in cases where the State Depart-
ment filed a suggestion of sovereign immunity, the courts exercised
their discretion by accepting this recommendation without further
analysis. 7 If the State Department chose not to file a suggestion, the
court made its own determination of whether immunity should be
granted.3 1 In 1976, Congress overhauled this approach to granting sov-
ereign immunity.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 197619 considerably
changed prior law' by defining standards for finding jurisdiction,
granting immunity, and awarding remedies.4" The courts are now to
make the determination of immunity without input from the State De-
partment,42 but the courts' discretion to find immunity has been cir-
cumscribed because the Act defines more clearly the situations in which
immunity may be applied.43
The Act establishes that immunity is the general rule' and then
provides numerous exceptions to the rule.45 Of special significance in
the antitrust area, the Act codifies the restrictive theory, withholding
immunity when the sovereign is engaged in a commercial activity.
46
Section 1605(a)(2) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or the States in any case...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 rd. at 34-35.
39 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(0, 1602-11
(Supp. IV 1980)).
40 For a discussion of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, see Note, Sovereign Immunity-
Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429
(1977); Comment, Proposed Draft Legislation of the Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Governments:
An Attempt to Revest the Courts with a Judicial Function, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 302 (1974); Note,
Judicial Immunities of Foreign States, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1225 (1974).
41 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(0, 1602-11
(Supp. IV 1980)).
42 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. IV 1980); B. HAwK, supra note 2, at 181.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
44 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. IV 1980).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. IV 1980).
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Section 1603(d) defines "commercial activity" as:
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.48
If comity considerations were deemed important by Congress, one
would have expected that they would be raised in the commercial activ-
ity context where it is clear that the foreign sovereign has an interest at
stake. Congress, however, did not include the concept of comity in the
determination of immunity and did not even mention comity in the
statute.
Act of State
Even if a foreign government is not a party to a law suit, the plain-
tiff may bring an act of the foreign government into issue. For exam-
ple, if the defendant is a government-related entity, it may assert that
its conduct is the protected political act of a foreign state. Alterna-
tively, if the defendant is a private enterprise, it may contend that the
plaintiffs claim requires judicial inquiry into the specific acts of a for-
eign government. A finding of sovereign immunity is not applicable
here because the foreign government is not being sued. Nonetheless,
the court is being asked to pass judgment on the action of a foreign
sovereign. The Supreme Court developed the act of state doctrine in
order to deal with this situation. In Underhill v. Hernandez49 the Court
stated:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Re-
dress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.
50
Thus, the Court reasoned that respect for the foreign sovereign re-
quired that the government's acts not be questioned. This justification
for the act of state doctrine closely resembles comity. The Court, how-
ever, greatly modified this rationale in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino .5
47 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
48 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
49 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
50 Id. at 252.
51 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (expropriation of sugar corporation's assets by Cuban government held
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In Sabbatino, the Court held that the act of state doctrine arose out
of separation of powers concerns; it was not mandated by international
law. According to Justice Harlan:
That international law does not require the application of the [act of state]
doctrine is evidenced by the practice of nations. Most of the countries
rendering decisions on the subject fail to follow the rule rigidly. No inter-
national arbitral or judicial decision discovered suggests that interna-
tional law prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of foreign
governments. . . .and apparently no claim has ever been raised before
an international tribunal that failure to apply the act of state doctrine
constitutes a breach of international obligation ...
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine;
it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review
the validity of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" under-
pinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of gov-
ernment in a system of separation of powers. . . . The doctrine as
formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of for-
eign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere.
5 2
This same rationale was echoed by Justice White in AlfredDunhill, Inc.
v. Cuba:5 3 "The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the
policy of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts
of foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive
Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations.
' 54
Following Sabbatino, Congress enacted legislation which both re-
stricted the act of state doctrine and shifted from the courts to the exec-
utive the discretion to determine the doctrine's applicability in certain
cases.55 This provision, which was added to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1965, states that the courts shall not allow the act of state doctrine to
be asserted in property confiscation cases unless
(1) [the] act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law. . . .or
(2) ... the President determines that application of the act of state doc-
trine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of
the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
to be an act of state despite allegations that the expropriation violated international and Cuban
law).
52 Id. at 421-23.
53 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
54 Id. at 697 (plurality opinion of Part III).
55 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2).
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that case with the court.
5 6
In sum, the Court's recent statements have diverged considerably
from the underlying rationale of Underhill that respect for the foreign
sovereign dictated the act of state doctrine. In fact, both Sabbatino and
Dunhil recall the Court's reasoning to justify sovereign immunity in
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,57 namely, that the Court's major con-
sideration is the executive branch's conduct of foreign relations rather
than respect for the foreign sovereign. Furthermore, in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1965, Congress took a position based on the preemi-
nence of the executive branch's concerns. Congress could have explic-
itly required that the courts look to comity considerations, but, instead,
Congress removed the foreign relations decision from the courts and
made the executive's determination in the matter dispositive.
Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
A related doctrine, and to some extent a corollary, to the act of
state doctrine is the antitrust defense of foreign sovereign compulsion.5 8
At its most basic, this doctrine insulates parties from liability under the
antitrust laws when the challenged activity was compelled or required
by a foreign government.59
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo, Inc. ,6o the
only case to date where the decision actually turned on this doctrine,
the court held that the defendants' refusal to supply oil to the plaintiff
was ordered by the Venezuelan government, and, therefore, this com-
pulsion was "a complete defense to an action under the antitrust laws
based on that boycott."'" The court characterized dicta in two earlier
cases62 and language in certain consent decrees63 as "scant authority"
to establish this defense.' Rather, the court reasoned that trade activi-
ties which are compelled by a government effectively become the acts
56 Id.
57 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
58 See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 152; THE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 50-52 (foreign sovereign
compulsion defense of Texas Maracaibo not recognized to the extent that compelled conduct is to
take place in the United States).
59 Id. at 148.
60 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
61 Id. at 1296.
62 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United States
v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cases (CCH) 70,600
(S.D.N.Y.).
63 See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,851, at 77,349 (S.D.N.Y.);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 69,849, at 77,340 (S.D.N.Y.).
64 Texas Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
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of the sovereign itself, and, under the act of state doctrine, these foreign
governmental acts may not be questioned by the courts.6" The court
also based its decision on considerations of fairness to the defendant. It
stated:
Commerce may exist at the will of the government, and to impose liability
for obedience to that will would eliminate for many companies the ability
to transact business in foreign lands. Were compulsion not a defense,
American firms abroad faced with a government order would have to
choose one country or the other in which to do business. The Sherman
Act does not go so far.66
Thus, the court did not justify its holding on the comity grounds of
respect and fairness to the foreign sovereign, but rather on act of state
considerations and notions of fairness to the compelled defendant.
Historically, therefore, the courts have applied the doctrines of for-
eign sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign sovereign compul-
sion to cases involving foreign sovereign interests. Judge Choy, in
Timberlane, formulated a new test for dealing with the presence of a
foreign government when none of these doctrines are available. This
new analysis would deny the application of the Sherman Act in cases
where the foreign harmony concerns of comity and fairness outweigh
the United States interest in fostering competition.
TIMBERLINE AND ITS PROGENY
Timberlane
In Timberlane,67 Judge Choy criticized the effects test6 as "incom-
plete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. Nor does it
expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship between
the actors and this country."6 9 Accordingly, Judge Choy proposed a
three-part analysis for determining whether to exercise extraterritorial




67 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane alleged that the Bank of America and other de-
fendants violated the Wilson Tariff Act and the Sherman Act. The defendants, allegedly, had
conspired to prevent Timberlane from milling lumber in Honduras, thereby preventing
Timberlane from importing this lumber into the United States. The alleged purpose of the de-
fendants' actions was to maintain control over the Honduran lumber industry and restrain trade
in exports to the United States.
68 Id. at 610.
69 Id. at 611-12.
70 Id. at 613.
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1. Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the for-
eign commerce of the United States?
2. Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation
of the Sherman Act?
3. As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it?7"
Judge Choy outlined the factors to be considered when answering
the third question. He said that a balancing test was required,7 2 and
that the elements to be weighed include:
1. the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
2. the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or princi-
pal places of business of corporations,
3. the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance,
4. the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere,
5. the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect Ameri-
can commerce,
6. the forseeability of such effect,
7. the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared with conduct abroad.73
The trial court in analyzing these factors was to identify the potential
conflict if the Sherman Act were applied and "then determine whether
in the face of [this conflict] the contacts and interests of the United
States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion."'74 In addition, Judge Choy suggested that the "field of the con-
flict of laws presents the proper approach" to this analysis.7 1
At first glance, Judge Choy's formulation may appear focused and
workable, but further analysis indicates that many of the factors are
undefined and the weight to be given each factor is unstated. Addition-
ally, invoking the conflict of laws approach does not clarify the analysis
because it is not at all clear what this approach involves, or whether it is
even appropriate. Furthermore, the court did not address the practical
difficulty of conducting this analysis. Perhaps most importantly, how-
ever, the court did not explain on what basis of authority it could find
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act and then refuse to exercise it, or,
alternatively, on what basis of authority it could include comity as part
71 Id. at 615.
72 Id. at 613-14 ("What we prefer is an evaluation and balancing of the relevant considera-
tions in each case. . . .The elements to be weighed include .
73 Id. at 614.
74 Id. at 614-15.
75 Id. at 613.
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of a jurisdictional determination. Each of these issues shall be dis-
cussed below.
Other Courts' Decisions
Three other courts have adopted Timberlane's comity analysis. In
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. ,76 a Sherman Act case al-
leging that foreign patents were secured by fraud, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "in deciding whether
jurisdiction should be exercised the district court should weigh the en-
forcement of the antitrust laws against the interests of comity and inter-
national relations. 77 The court proposed ten factors to be considered
in the comity analysis for each of the twenty-six foreign nations where
Congoleum held patents.78 The court recognized that this analysismight yield different results for different nations, yet, nonetheless, or-
dered that the analysis be undertaken.7 9
An opinion from the Southern District of New York also adopted
the Timberlane comity formulation. In Dominica Americana Bohio v.
Gulf & Western Industries,8" Judge Carter criticized the effects test as
"inadequate because it fails to take into account potential problems of
76 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). Mannington, an American manufacturer of floor covering,
brought a Sherman Act action against Congoleum, another American manufacturer, alleging that
patents in 26 foreign countries were secured by fraud. Had these alleged actions occurred in
securing a domestic patent, the Sherman Act allegedly would have been violated. Mannington
urged that the domestic standards be extended into the foreign arena and sought damages and
injunctive relief.
77 Id. at 1290.
78 Id. at 1297-98. These factors are:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeabiity;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to per-
form an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. Factors 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8 are practically identical to factors 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 in Timberlane.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
79 Mfanning/on Mills, 595 F.2d at 1298.
80 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiffs, composed of both United States and foreign
corporations and individuals, alleged that defendant, Gulf & Western, and many of its subsidiar-
ies, monopolized tourist facilities in part of the Dominican Republic by engaging in acts illegal
under the Sherman Act).
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international comity."8 In Bohio, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to monopolize
tourist facilities in the Dominican Republic. 8 2 The court held that the
proper standard for determining whether the Sherman Act was appli-
cable was a balancing test which "weighs the impact of the foreign con-
duct on United States commerce against the potential international
repercussions of asserting jurisdiction. ' 83 The court refrained from de-
termining if considerations of international comity should enter the
threshold question of whether Sherman Act jurisdiction exists or if
these considerations, instead, go to the question of whether Sherman
Act jurisdiction should be exercised. The court held that in either case
the record was inadequate to consider properly many of the factors
raised in Timberlane and Manningon Mills and, consequently, ordered
further discovery on these issues.
8 4
The international comity balancing test was most recently required
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 85 In Zenith,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to destroy the
United States consumer electronics product industry by artificially low-
ering export prices to the United States. 6 Judge Becker of the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that he was
bound by the Third Circuit's decision in Mannington Mills, yet went
beyond mere acceptance of the comity test to comment favorably upon
Timberlane.87 The court concluded that "the Alcoa plus comity test
applied in Mannington Mills is equally appropriate for the case at
bar."8 8
TIMBERLINE AND COMITY: JURISDICTION VEL NON OR
ABSTENTION?
As previously noted, Judge Choy formulated a tripartite analysis
in Timberlane to resolve the issue of the extraterritorial application of
81 Id. at 687.
82 Id. at 684-86.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 688.
85 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (plaintiffs allege that the defendants have conspired to
destroy the United States domestic consumer electronics product industry by artificially lowering
export prices, thereby violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 73 of the Wilson
Tariff Act).
86 Id. at 1164.
87 Id. at 1187. Judge Becker stated: "The most thorough and thoughtful analysis of the con-
cerns relevant to the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was provided by Judge Choy in
Timberlane .. "
88 Id. at 1189.
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the Sherman Act.8 9 It is not clear, however, if this analysis goes to the
question of whether jurisdiction exists or the question of whether a
court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction once it has been found
to exist. As will be discussed below, each alternative possesses different
implications with regard to whether there is a valid basis of authority
for establishing the test, how the proof is to be developed, and whether
the Constitution may have been violated.
Jurisdiction
Congress would have to have intended that considerations of com-
ity be included in the determination of Sherman Act jurisdiction in or-
der for Judge Choy properly to pursue his comity analysis. Although
he recognized that Alcoa's analysis of effects was based upon presumed
legislative intent,90 Judge Choy did not explicitly base his analysis on
this foundation. John Will Ongman, however, when discussing the
scope of the Sherman Act's foreign commerce jurisdiction, has sug-
gested that Congress may be presumed to have incorporated doctrines
of international law into the Sherman Act.91 Consequently, he states,
the courts should interpret the Sherman Act to be consistent with inter-
national law because Congress did not explicitly direct otherwise.92
Applying this argument, courts would have authority to pursue a
comity analysis if comity were considered a principle of international
law. Both case law and commentary, as has already been demon-
strated, indicate that comity is a discretionary doctrine-not to be ap-
plied if doing so would be contrary to the nation's interest or policy.
93
The discretionary nature of comity and its resultant uncertainty would
seem to preclude it from rising to the status of a principle of interna-
tional law, even though it may be a concept frequently referred to in
the international field. Mr. Ongman appeared to recognize this distinc-
tion when he stated: "Although in a particular factual situation it may
be permissible under public international law to apply the Sherman
Act, still it might be unwise from the point of view of international
comity.' '94 Judge Choy in imberlane also mentioned comity as if it
were distinct and separate from international law when he spoke in
terms of "comity, international law, and good judgment.
95
89 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613; see supra text accompanying note 71.
90 Id. at 609.
91 Ongman, supra note 2, at 735-38.
92 Id. at 737.
93 See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
94 Ongman, supra note 2, at 738.
95 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610.
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Despite the difficulty of establishing implied congressional intent
to include comity in Sherman Act extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis,
it is, nonetheless, useful to follow the reasoning and determine how the
jurisdictional component would affect constitutional considerations
and the burden of proof. If comity were found to be part of the juris-
dictional test, no cause of action could accrue unless the comity hurdle
were surmounted. Consequently, the due process problem of depriving
a person of a vested property interest (i.e., a cause of action) would be
avoided. Burden of proof problems, however, may accrue.
Normally, jurisdiction must be pleaded and proved by the plain-
tiff.96 If comity were an element of jurisdiction, then Sherman Act
plaintiffs in cases involving a foreign element might be required to
plead that comity concerns need not block a finding that the court has
jurisdiction. The court would have to determine which allegations are
sufficient to allow the plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the court could presume that
no comity problems exist, eliminating the need for formal allegations in
the complaint. If the defendant offers proof that comity concerns are
involved, however, the court must then decide whether the plaintiff
needs to prove counterbalancing interests which outweigh the comity
concerns raised by the defendant.
To include comity as an element in finding jurisdiction, therefore,
would force a court to make the tenuous argument that Congress in-
tended comity to be included in the jurisdictional analysis. Even if that
hurdle is surmounted, the courts must then decide the procedures for
pleading and proving this jurisdictional element.
Abstention
The second interpretation of Timberlane's Sherman Act extraterri-
toriality test assumes that jurisdiction has been found and that comity
concerns enter the analysis to determine whether jurisdiction should be
exercised. This interpretation may be characterized broadly as an ab-
stention doctrine in the international context. Because abstention does
not generally depend upon a grant of power from Congress, but rather
is within the inherent discretion of the judiciary, problems of finding
legislative intent do not exist.97 Similarly, because this practice is dis-
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
97 See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 233 (1980) ("Under the label of 'abstention,' the Supreme Court has developed a number
of complex .. doctrines to justify either rejection or postponement of the assertion of federal
court power even though Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear the cases in
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cretionary, the courts have the flexibility to determine whether the
plaintiff should be required to plead the absence of comity concerns in
his complaint. Abstention in the international Sherman Act context is
severely weakened, however, because it diverges from the rationale for
applying abstention in other contexts and because it may raise a signifi-
cant constitutional problem.
Traditionally, abstention does not deprive a litigant of a cause of
action, but rather forces the litigant either to take his cause to another
forum or to get a definitive interpretation of the law in another forum
and then return to federal court.98 In Pullman abstention, for example,
where a state action is being challenged in federal court as contrary to
the federal Constitution and there are questions of state law that may
determine the case, the federal court will abstain from deciding the case
until the parties obtain a state court decision on the state issue.99 Ac-
cording to Martin Redish:
Under the label of "abstention," the Supreme Court has devised a
number of complex, often interrelated doctrines to justify either rejection
or postponement of the assertion of federal court power even though Con-
gress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear the cases in ques-
tion. The common factor shared by most of the forms of federal
abstention is the presence of an uncertain or ambiguous issue of state
law. . . .But the presence of an uncertain issue of state law, standing
alone, has never constituted a sufficient basis for abstention; each branch
of the doctrine requires the presence of one or more additional factors
before abstention will be allowed. °°
Abstention in the Sherman Act context, therefore, differs consider-
ably from state/federal notions of abstention because the antitrust liti-
gant is not being sent to another forum. Rather, he is being deprived of
his cause of action entirely. If this path is followed, the possibility of
constitutional due process problems must be considered. At the least, a
court's refusal to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction does not fall neatly
or persuasively within traditional notions of abstention.
The Views of Other Courts and Commentators
Other courts and commentators have disagreed as to whether
Judge Choy intended comity considerations to enter as part of the
question."); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 163-64 (1976) ("There is nothing
in the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)] about abstention, and the doctrine is not easy to reconcile
with § 1331, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under federal law.").
98 See generally M. REDISH, supra note 97, at 233-58; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
218-29 (1976).
99 C. WRIGHT, supra note 98, at 218-19 (1976).
100 M. REDISH, supra note 97, at 233.
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threshold jurisdictional test or, instead, as part of the decision whether
to exercise jurisdiction. In fact, Judge Carter of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, in DominicusAmeri-
cana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries,l"' explicitly refrained from
deciding this issue. Proponents of the jurisdictional test interpretation
include: Judge Adams, in his concurring opinion in Mannington
Mills;° 2 Judge Becker of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. ;103 John Shenefield, former head of the Department
of Justice Antitrust Division;° and Barry Hawk, author of a treatise in
this field.' 5
Judge Adams made it particularly clear that he believed that com-
ity entered the threshold jurisdictional question in Timberlane. He
stated that "Timberlane. . . demonstrate[s that]. . . considerations [of
international comity] have been incorporated into an expanded juris-
dictional test."'0 6 Judge Adams also strongly criticized the abstention
approach adopted by the Mannington majority:
The majority apparently is of the view that the existence of jurisdiction is
to be determined solely under an "effects" standard, but that a court may
then decline to exercise jurisdiction because of considerations of interna-
tional comity. As I understand it, however, a court may not abstain
where jurisdiction properly lies unless abstention is warranted under a
recognized abstention doctrine. . . . And to my knowledge no abstention
doctrine exists with respect to considerations of international comity. 107
By contrast, other courts and writers have taken equally strong po-
sitions that Timberlane expresses an abstention doctrine, i.e., although
jurisdiction exists, the court, in its discretion, refuses to exercise this
jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit clearly interpreted Timberlane as standing for abstention: "The
clear thrust of the Timberlane Court is that once a district judge has
determined that he has jurisdiction, he should consider additional fac-
tors to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate."'
'0 8
The court reinforced this contention in a footnote, where it stated:
101 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
102 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1299 (3d Cir. 1979).
103 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
104 Remarks before the A.B.A. Section of International Law, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 2, at 22 ("[Judge Choy] held that where considerations of comity do not weigh heavily in
favor of applying U.S. law, our courts, as a matter of law, not merely as a matter of discretion,
lack subject matter jurisdiction.").
105 B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 39-44.
106 Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1301-02 n.9 (Adams, J., concurring).
107 Id.
108 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
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"While the Timberlane Court appears to have grafted the adjective
'substantiar to Learned Hand's intended effects test, the Alcoa standard
emerges from Timberlane essentially intact."'
10 9
Ongman has also adopted the abstention characterization of
Timberlane, stating: "Judge Choy seems to have presented his 'interna-
tional setting' element as a basis on which a federal court, which has
acquired full subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause of action, may
nonetheless abstain for reasons of 'international comity and fairness'
from deciding the case." 110
Finally, the Mannington Mills majority seems to have interpreted
Timberlane as finding jurisdiction and then asking whether or not to
exercise it.111 After the Mannington court found jurisdiction by apply-
ing the effects test, it stated: "In Timberlane . .. , the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit adopted a balancing process in determining
whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised, an approach
with which we find ourselves in substantial agreement."' 12
There are numerous differing opinions as to whether Judge Choy
in Timberlane was formulating a new jurisdictional test, or propound-
ing a new abstention doctrine. Perhaps this uncertain situation is best
summed up by the succinct statement of a note writer in the Northwest-
ern Journal of International Law & Business: "Timberlane, itself, is not
clear about the question whether the tripartite analysis is to be one test
for subject matter jurisdiction."'
113
Parsing the Timberlane Opinion
Judge Choy proposed his tripartite analysis as a result of his dis-
satisfaction with the effects test for finding jurisdiction' 14 Although
Judge Choy appeared to intend to broaden the effects test and its cor-
rollaries when he argued that "[a] more comprehensive inquiry is nec-
essary" and labeled his approach "a jurisdictional rule of reason,"I"
the words he chose to broaden the jurisdictional test could just as rea-
sonably apply to an abstention analysis. For example, he stated:
lt is evident that at some point the interests of the United States are too
weak and the foreign harmony incentive too strong tojustfy an extraterri-
109 Id. at 1255 n.25.
110 Ongman, supra note 2, at 743 n.34.
111 Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297.
112 Id.
113 Note, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.: A Further Step Toward a Complete Sub-
ject Matter Jurisdiction Test, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 241, 260 (1980).
114 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610-12.
115 Id. at 613.
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torial assertion ofjurisdiction. 116
An effect on United States commerce, although necessary to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis
on: which to determine whether American authority should be asserted in a
given case." 7
Having assessed the conffict, the court should then determine
whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United States are
sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorialjurisdiction "118
As a matter of international comity and fairness, shouldthe extraterri-
torialjurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it?" 9
Using phrases such as "to justify an assertion," "to support the exer-
cise," and "should be asserted" imply that extraterritorial jurisdiction
exists and that the appropriate question becomes whether this jurisdic-
tion should be exercised or asserted.
Perhaps the jurisdiction/abstention confusion can be illuminated
by viewing the totality of Judge Choy's analysis. Recalling the other
two elements of Timberlanes' tripartite investigation, 20 Judge Choy
was attempting to take a broad overview of the extraterritorial picture
and force these elements into a jurisdictional analysis. The first factor
was somewhat broader than Alcoa's effects test: "Does the alleged re-
straint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the
United States?"' 2 ' This statement of the effects test presents a lower
hurdle for the plaintiff than Alcoa because it is phrased in the disjunc-
tive, whereas Alcoa required both intent and effect.' 22 Judge Choy's
second factor introduces the magnitude of the alleged harm into the
analysis.' 23 Normally, injury would enter an antitrust analysis as a
necessary element for stating a private cause of action under the Sher-
man Act, not as an element of jurisdiction. 124 And finally, Judge Choy
introduced into his jurisdictional analysis comity considerations and
balancing of international interests through the use of abstention-like
116 Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
118 Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
120 See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
121 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
122 See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 42.
123 "Is [the alleged restraint] of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation
of the Sherman Act?" Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
124 See B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 43-44.
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language. Neither the second nor third factors enter a traditional juris-
diction vel non determination.
Perhaps Judge Choy was attempting to force the courts to look at
the total picture at an early stage in antitrust litigation involving ele-
ments of foreign sensitivity in order to resolve the dispute as quickly as
possible.
Asserted Authority for Appoying Comity
The Ninth Circuit and the three other courts which have adopted
the comity analysis justified their approach on the grounds that the ef-
fects test was inadequate for failing to consider the foreign nation's in-
terests before applying the Sherman Act to activities outside of the
United States.1 25 Although this conclusion may justify dissatisfaction
with the effects test, it does not provide a principled basis of authority
for restricting the statutory language of the Sherman Act. Theoreti-
cally, mere judicial dissatisfaction with a legislative enactment does not
give the judiciary the authority to rewrite the law.
Judge Choy attempted to support his comity analysis by invoking
two beguiling sources of authority, the conflict of laws and section 40 of
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law,'2 6 and concluded,
with an equally beguiling label, a "jurisdictional rule of reason."'
' 27
Conflict of Laws
With regard to conflict of laws, Judge Choy stated:
We believe that the field of conflict of laws presents the proper approach,
as was suggested, if not specifically employed, in 41coa in expressing the
basic limitation on application of American laws:
[We] are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without
regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the ex-
ercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those
fixed by the "Conflict of Laws."'1
28
Regrettably, Judge Choy omitted the critical next sentence from
the Alcoa opinion: "We should not impute to Congress an intent to
punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no conse-
quences within the United States."' 1 9 It here appears that Judge Hand
125 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d at
1296-98; Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. at 687; Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. at 1187.
126 T'mberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 41coa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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grounded his conclusion in Alcoa on presumed legislative intention,
and took a tack very similar to the rule of reason analysis in Standard
oil. 13 In Standard Oil, the Court held that even though the Sherman
Act is framed in very broad language, Congress could not have in-
tended to get at every restraint of trade; rather, the Court read in a
presumed intent of Congress to apply common law principles and
reach only those restraints which unduly restrict competition.' InAl-
coa, Judge Hand reasoned analogously to the approach taken in Stan-
dard Oil, and presumed that Congress did not intend to get at all
restraints of trade by foreigners anywhere in the world which might
have some effect on United States commerce, unless those restraints
also were intended to have effects in the United States.132 Both theAl-
coa and Standard Oil limitations are generalized and based on pre-
sumed legislative intent. Timberlane's limitation, however, is based on
the specific comity circumstances of each case and is not grounded ex-
pressly in notions of legislative intent.
133
Where Judge Hand explicitly concluded that presumed legislative
intent provided the authority for Alcoa's narrowing of the Sherman
Act, Judge Choy did not point explicitly to any similar basis of author-
ity for his potentially far more restrictive limitation-allowing the judi-
ciary the discretion to balance competing national interests on a case-
by-case basis.
Furthermore, using a conflict of laws approach in the Sherman Act
context is inherently misleading. Conflicts problems arise when a court
is faced with a law which does not address directly whether the law
should be applied extraterritorially.3 The court must determine
whether its jurisdiction's law should apply to a case in which another
jurisdiction's law may also be applicable and in which the court's own
legislature failed to state expressly that its law should apply. By con-
trast, if the court's state (or national) legislature expressly states that its
130 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
131 Id. at 58-66.
132 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
133 See infra text accompanying notes 165-184.
134 In his COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1841), Joseph Story stated:
§ 23. III. [W]hatever force and obligation the laws of one country have in another, depend
solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter. . .. A state may prohibit the
operation of all foreign laws, and the rights growing out of them, within its own territories. It
may prohibit some foreign laws, and it may admit the operation of others. . . . When its
code speaks positively on the subject, it must be obeyed by all persons, who are within reach
of its sovereignty. When its customary, unwritten, or common law speaks directly on the
subject, it is equally to be obeyed .... When both are silent, then, and then only, can the
question properly arise, what law is to govern in the absence of any clear declaration of the
sovereign will. ...
(emphasis added).
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act is to apply extraterritorially, then,from the court's point of view, no
conflict of laws problem exists. Assuming the law was a valid exercise
of legislative power, the court is obligated to enforce that law. 135 Theo-
retically, only when the law is silent on extraterritorial application does
the court have discretion to pursue a choice of law analysis.
136
Timberlane takes the choice of law balancing approach despite the
Sherman Act's foreign commerce provision which provides for extra-
territorial application. In order to limit the Sherman Act's application
on a principled basis, a court should not apply conflicts principles as if
the foreign commerce provision was not there; rather the court should
work within the language and interpret congressional intent.
Restatement
Judge Choy also cited section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law as authority for Timberlane's comity ap-
proach.137 He stated that "[t]his section was obviously fashioned with
trade regulation problems in mind, for all five illustrations presented in
the comment to this section involve such regulation."' 38 The language
of section 40 and its illustrations, even though they relate to trade regu-
lation, do not support Timberlane's balancing of national interests test.
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in
good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction
139
The word "require" is critical to the understanding of this section.
In Timberlane, only the United States required conduct, that is, behav-
ior consistent with the Sherman Act. Honduras, by contrast, simply
enforced a security interest. 4 ' The bringing of the secured transaction
suit was totally discretionary with the plaintiffs (defendants in the
Timberlane action). The Timberlane opinion recognized the absence of
any mandatory Honduran requirement when it found that neither the
135 See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) ("if Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United
States,. . . a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this
would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment").
136 See supra note 134.
137 Timberlane, 349 F.2d at 613.
138 Id. at 613 n.27.
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965).
140 Timberlane, 349 F.2d at 608.
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act of state nor foreign sovereign compulsion defenses were avail-
able. 14  Consequently, the Timberlane facts do not fit within the sec-
tion 40 characterization that "the rules [the two states] may prescribe
require inconsistent conduct."'
' 42
The five illustrations to section 40 go directly to the issue of incon-
sistent mandates from the two nations, rather than to the Timberlane
situation where the conduct inconsistent with the Sherman Act was dis-
cretionary with the defendants. In Illustration 1,143 state A has restric-
tive trade practice legislation whereas state B does not. X, a national of
A, and Y, a national of B, agree not to sell in each other's home mar-
kets. Although this agreement violates the law of state A, it is enforcea-
ble in state B. Consequently, Y may bring a breach of contract action
in state B if X is ordered by state A to compete with Y in state B. The
illustration concludes: "The court in A is required to consider whether
under the circumstances the jurisdiction of A should be exercised and,
if exercised, whether the court's decree should require conduct within B
inconsistent with the law of that state requiring the performance of
contracts."144
The facts in this illustration, thus, vary considerably from those in
Timberlane, where the defendants maintained complete discretion over
whether to sue to enforce their security interest. In the illustration, X
did not initiate the judicial action which might require conduct incon-
sistent with the laws of another state. In Timberlane, by contrast, there
was no third party petitioning the courts to force the defendants to take
specific actions, the discretion to use the courts rested entirely with the
Timberlane defendants. Consequently, the Timberlane defendants, un-
like X, could not argue that they might be forced to violate the Sher-
man Act because they sought the order allowing the violative conduct.
Furthermore, the illustration's conclusion is directed more at the
remedy than at the jurisdictional question. Actually, rather than refer-
ring to questions of subject matter jurisdiction, this illustration seems to
be pointed at cases such as United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries, 45 where the court ordered conduct which violated the contract
141 Id. at 606-08, ("Here, the allegedly 'sovereign' acts of Honduras consisted of judicial pro-
ceedings which were initiated by Caminals, a private party and one of the alleged co-conspirators,
not by the Honduran government itself.").
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965) (emphasis added).
143 Id. § 40, comment a, illustration 1.
144 Id.
145 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (antitrust decree ordering compulsory licensing of patents
in Great Britain even though such order would force Imperial Chemicals to breach its exclusive
patent license to British Nylon Spinners, a British corporation not doing business or otherwise
present in the United States).
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law of another nation.
Similarly, in Illustration 2,146 the focus is on remedy and required
conduct. Here, the court of state A requires X to compete actively in
state B or face imprisonment for civil contempt. The illustration con-
cludes that the court of B, on a suit by Y for the enforcement of the
agreement, "should. .. take into account the exercise of jurisdiction
by A, as by according X a defense or by mitigating damages." 147
Unlike the first two illustrations, the Honduran court in
Timberlane did not require any specific conduct. Rather, the court only
granted the Timberlane defendants the power to enforce their security
interest after these defendants chose to petition the court. The defen-
dants were not compelled to exercise this interest. Nor could a third
party force the defendants to exercise their security interest. By con-
trast, in the above illustrations, a party other than the antitrust defen-
dant could force conduct inconsistent with the laws of another state in
order to enforce the agreements. As a result, these illustrations based
on mandatory conduct provide little support for the more discretionary
situation of Timberlane.
Nor do Illustrations 3, 4, or 5 support the court's analysis in
Timberlane. Illustrations 3 and 4 are examples of the effects test of
section 18148 (based in major part on the Alcoa decision). In Illustra-
tion 3,149 state A has restrictive trade legislation. Both states A and B
use a particular commodity for defense purposes. B's only source of
this commodity is state C. Nationals of C, acting in B and C, secure a
monopoly in the commodity in order to control its distribution in B.
The agreement giving rise to the monopoly is enforceable in C. The
illustration concludes that A does not have jurisdiction to apply its an-
titrust law,'50 although the basis for this conclusion is not stated.
Illustration 4151 makes it clear that Illustration 3's conclusion is not
based on comity, but, rather, on there being no intended or actual ef-
fects in state A.'52 Illustration 4 adds that the commodity is also im-
ported into A from C and that the monopoly affects these imports. The
illustration concludes that "A, having jurisdiction on the territorial ba-
sis to apply its law to the monopoly under the rule stated in § 18, may
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40, comment a, illustration 2
(1965).
147 Id.
148 Id. § 18.
149 Id. § 40.
150 Id.
151 Id. § 40, comment b, illustration 4.
152 Id.
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be expected to exercise its jurisdiction in view of the relationship of the
exercise to its vital national interest."' 53 No mention of comity or bal-
ancing competing interests is made. In fact, the failure to consider
these issues in this context, where the agreement is enforceable in C,
actually undermines the Timberlane analysis.
Finally, Illustration 5154 also fails to support Timberlane's comity
analysis. This illustration assumes the same facts as Illustration 4 but
adds that "the monopoly is required by the law of B." ' 55 The illustra-
tion concludes: "Even though A has jurisdiction on the territorial basis
under the rule stated in § 18, to apply its law to the monopoly, it must
also apply the rule stated in this Section, and take into consideration
the resulting hardship on the participants in the monopoly."' 56 This
conclusion is based on foreign sovereign compulsion reasoning rather
than on comity considerations. The rationale for the conclusion is fair-
ness to the participants, as in Texas Maracaibo,1 57 rather than respect
for a foreign sovereign. Once again, the absence of comity considera-
tions in a situation where they might have been appropriate cuts
against the Timberlane analysis rather than in support of it.
Jurisdictional Rule of Reason
Judge Choy concluded that "what we prefer is an evaluation and
balancing of the relevant considerations in each case-in the words of
Kingman Brewster, a 'jurisdictional rule of reason.' "15 This phrase
lends an aura of legitimacy to the balancing approach because it ap-
pears to be associated with the foundation concept of the rule of reason
as first stated in Standard Oil.' 19 This jurisdictional rule of reason,
however, bears little doctrinal resemblance to Standard Oil's rule of
reason. 6 ° In fact, the balancing concept confficts directly with histori-
cal rule of reason analysis.
161
In Standard Oil, the Court was faced with the Sherman Act's abso-
153 Id.
154 Id. § 40, comment b, illustration 1.
155 Id. (emphasis added).
156 Id.
157 See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
158 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
159 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
160 This fact was explicitly recognized by Kingman Brewster. He stated: "Unlike antitrust's
rule of reason developed in interstate commerce,. . . [the components of the jurisdictional rule of
reason] are a response to essentially political rather than economic and business considerations."
K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, at 446.
161 L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 165-97 (1977). But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1932); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917).
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lutely restrictive language that "[e]very contract, combination. . . , or
conspiracy in restraint of trade. . . is illegal."'6 2 Read literally, this
language could prohibit virtually all commercial agreements.
163 Con-
sequently, the Court limited the application of the Sherman Act only to
those agreements which had an undue restraint on competition. 164 Al-
though given the discretion to determine whether a particular restraint
was undue, the courts are limited to analyzing only the competitive
effects of the agreement. The analysis does not allow for balancing
other societal interests against the effect on competition to determine if
the restraint was reasonable, and thus not a violation of the Sherman
Act.
This seminal statement of the rule of reason has been echoed in
more recent cases. Justice Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court in
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States165 stated:
Contrary to its name, the Rule [of Reason] does not open the field of
antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that
may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions.
The test prescribed in Standard Oil is whether the challenged con-
tracts or acts "were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."
... [T]he inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive
conditions.
[.. T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a pol-
icy favoring competition is in the public interest. . . . Subject to excep-
tions defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by the
Congress. 166
Thus, traditional rule of reason analysis identifies competitive ef-
fect as the only variable to be measured when determining whether an
agreement falls within the Sherman Act. By contrast, the "jurisdic-
tional rule of reason" explicitly broadens the jurisdictional analysis to
factors outside of competitive effect. As a result, the use of this label,
which raises associations with traditional rule of reason analysis, seems
inappropriate and misleading. This balancing test is more a rule of
reasonableness based on non-competitive interests 167 -a standard
162 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added).
163 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63.
164 Id.
165 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
166 Id. at 690-92.
167 The American Law Institute (ALL) has adopted the reasonableness concept in its Tentative
Draft No. 2 of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
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which the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected.
68
THE TIMBERLANE TEST: APPLICATION AND IMPLICATION IN
PRACTICE
In Timberlane, the court set out a list of factors to be considered as
part of the comity analysis.' 69 These factors are to be weighed and then
balanced against the interests of the United States to determine
whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is supported. 7 ° Although the court
stated these factors in a straightforward fashion, assessing the content
of these elements and their respective weights is anything but simple.
Furthermore, the court spoke of United States interests as if these inter-
ests were self-evident.' 7 ' Once again, this implied straightforwardness
of the interest analysis is a serious over-simplification.
Judge Choy derived the elements of his comity analysis in
Timberlane from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law,
section 40, and from Kingman Brewster's Antitrust and American Busi-
ness Abroad.72 Judge Choy stated the first factor as "the degree of
conflict with foreign law or policy."' 7 3 The "foreign law" aspect of this
factor lends itself to discrete analysis because the foreign nation either
does or does not have laws which regulate trade and, if it does, these
laws may be objectively ascertained. The analysis then takes an uncer-
tain tack, however, if the foreign nation does not have trade regulation
comparable to that of the United States. The foreign nation's inaction
may be an affirmative rejection by that government, a general lack of
interest or a simple delay. A United States court is generally not
equipped to decide which possibility occurred.
The "policy" aspect of this factor is even more confusing. It is
unclear whether this "policy" is that of the foreign government or the
foreign policy of the United States. Assuming Judge Choy was refer-
VISED). The ALI has formulated a new approach to the extraterritorial application of United
States laws in general, § 403, and antitrust laws in particular, § 415. The reasonableness analysis
was drawn in part from sections 7, 17, 18, and 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW (1965); section 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW; and the
comity analysis of Timberlane and Manningion Mills.
After only a superficial investigation of this draft, many of the criticisms of Timberlane's
comity analysis, e.g., authority, practical difficulties, and political questions, seem to apply equally
to the ALI formulation.
168 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 161, at 165-97.
169 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614; see supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
170 Timber/ane, 549 F.2d at 613-14; see supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
171 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
172 Id. at 614 n.31.
173 Id.
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ring to the foreign nation's policy, determining the content of that pol-
icy will be difficult. Should the parties seek to question foreign
officials? Should the court admit testimony of political science experts?
Should the court assume that the foreign nation's policy is determined
by the interests expressed in its trade regulation laws, or, if there are no
laws, by the conclusions which may be drawn from their absence?
Judge Choy supplied no answers to these questions.
The second factor, "the nationality or allegiance of the parties and
the locations or principal places of business of corporations," '174 is eas-
ily ascertainable. Judge Choy recognized that "[w]hether the alleged
offender is an American citizen. . . may make a big difference; apply-
ing American laws to American citizens raises fewer problems than ap-
plication to foreigners."' 7 5 Kingman Brewster, however, complicates
the straightforward assessment of this factor by stating: "[F]oreign re-
sentment may be aroused because, despite formal American national-
ity, local business is expected to feel a local allegiance."'
7 6
Consequently, it appears that the parties must also ascertain the foreign
nation's attitude toward local business.
The third factor, "the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance,"' 177 is practically identical to an
element found in section 40 of the Restatement.'78 It is not at all clear,
however, how the effectiveness of enforcement to achieve compliance
enters into a comity analysis. In fact, the Restatement addressed this
factor in the context of a state's choice of the proper forum to accom-
plish its own objectives; not in the context of affording the foreign state
comity. 1
79
The consideration of a state's accomplishing its own objectives by
resolving the trade regulation dispute in another forum is inapposite to
the jurisdictional question in a private antitrust action and provides no
174 Id.
175 Id. at 612.
176 K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, at 447.
177 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40(e) (1965) states that one part of
its comity analysis is "the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state."
179 Id. Comment (e) to section 40 states, in pertinent part:
In some situations, where a state has jurisdiction under the rule stated in § 18 [basically the
effects test] .... it may not be reasonable to expect that the initiation of proceedings against a
defendant found within the jurisdiction and the application to him in that proceeding of the regu-
latory law of the state will really be effective to attain the objectives of that law. Where this is so,
more effective means for the attainment of the state's objectives may be sought. In some instances
these may be efforts to unify substantive law. . . . In still other situations, diplomatic negotiations
leading to an international agreement may be the best route.
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support for the Timberlane analysis. Presumably, the antitrust plaintiff
will have considered the effectiveness of enforcement by means of a
judicial proceeding before bringing suit. Regardless of whether the ef-
fectiveness of enforcement was considered or not, however, this ele-
ment is misplaced in a comity analysis. A feeling of mutual
consideration and respect is not the motive for refusing a judicial fo-
rum in this instance. Rather, when the state is faced with the prospect
that its enforcement attempt will not accomplish anything, the Restate-
ment suggests that the state should look elsewhere to accomplish its
own objectives.
The fourth factor introduces "the relative significance of effects on
the United States as compared with those elsewhere."' I 0 If the effects
on the United States are limited to the amount of commerce involved
in the alleged restraint, this element has been subsumed under the sec-
ond leg of Judge Choy's tripartite analysis, considering whether the
magnitude of the restraint is sufficiently large to be cognizable as a civil
violation of the Sherman Act.' If the "effects" elsewhere are not lim-
ited to harmful effects, then the more effective the restraint, probably
the more beneficial the effect to the foreign country because that coun-
try's commerce is likely being increased, at least in the short run, as a
result of the restraint on United States commerce. Even if this factor
were limited to harmful effects, it is not clear what significance this
should have for a jurisdictional analysis. If effects in the United States
were great, but the effects elsewhere were much greater, this cannot
support the conclusion that the United States should defer to another
country's laws.
The fifth and sixth factors, extent and foreseeability of explicit
purpose to affect American commerce, 182 go to the state of mind of the
defendant, not to comity considerations. Conceptually, if comity is the
goal, then the actions of the individual participants should be irrelevant
since the interests of the sovereign are the focus of the analysis, not the
wrongdoing of the defendant. To cloud the comity analysis by examin-
ing the intent behind the defendant's conduct defeats the comity pur-
pose because foreign interests are thereby ignored. The first step of
Timberlane's tripartite analysis considered the nature of the defen-
dant's conduct. 183 Perhaps these fifth and sixth factors are more appro-
priate to the tripartite analysis than to the comity investigation.
180 Timber/ane, 549 F.2d at 614.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 613, 615.
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The seventh factor, "the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad," 18 4 also lends very little to the comity analysis. This element
simply restates the conditions under which a foreign interest analysis is
appropriate. If there were allegedly illegal conduct in the United States
as well as abroad, the courts would have no problem exercising juris-
diction. This conclusion was expressly accepted by Kingman Brew-
ster 8 - when he stated that a court would be justified in enforcing the
antitrust laws in this context because "[t]o rule otherwise would impair
our ability to effectively maintain the integrity of the competitive policy
at home."' 86 This result leaves us with a restatement of the problem-
little or no conduct in the United States and substantial conduct
abroad. It does not aid the analysis.
Once these factors are analyzed, Timberlane directs that the court
must balance these interests against the interests of the United
States. "' Before any balancing can be done, however, the court must
first determine the respective weights of each factor in the balancing
calculus, and then the interests of the United States. Timberlane of-
fered no guidance as to the relative weights of these elements. In addi-
tion, Timberlane did not analyze United States interests, thereby
leaving the trial court with numerous unanswered questions. Is the
magnitude of the competitive restraint determinative of the interest in-
volved? Does the executive branch express the interest of the United
States? Does the congressional expression of intent to regulate an-
ticompetitive activity dominate the interest question? The trial court
must confront and answer these questions before Timberlane's comity
determination can be made.
After delving beneath the apparent certainty of the Timberlane
factors, three additional questions remain:
1. What are the practical difficulties of conducting a Timberlane-
type analysis?
2. Does the Timberlane analysis accomplish the apparent objec-
tives which the court sought?
3. Is a court the appropriate forum for making the comity
determination?
184 Id. at 614.
185 K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, at 447.
186 Id.
187 2imberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
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The Analysis in Practice
The theoretical difficulties pale beside the practical problems of
pursuing a Timberlane analysis. At the most basic: who may bring the
case? Judge Choy did not answer this question. If comity is to enter
the jurisdictional question, then the burden is probably on the plaintiff
to plead and prove these jurisdictional elements.8 8 Kingman Brewster
was clear as to who, carries the burden: "The burden of establishing
any one of these jurisdictional requirements should be borne by the
plaintiff. Where more than one element is involved, proof of one of
these should not operate to raise a presumption that the other ex-
ists." '89 Judge Carter of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, however, took the contrary position. 90 After
holding that a Timberlane-type analysis must be made, the court stated:
"Naturally, the defendants must bear the burden of demonstrating that
foreign policy considerations outweigh the need to enforce the antitrust
laws where the foreign commerce of the United States is affected."''
Complicating the matter further, if a comity analysis is part of the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction determination, the court itself may be obligated
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure92 to raise the issue on its
own motion.
The burden of proof question revolves around the issue of whether
the Timberlane analysis is part of the jurisdictional determination or
whether it arises as part of an abstention judgment. 9 3 Certainly the
courts should answer this question clearly before the parties are obli-
gated to develop the issue.
Once the burden of proof determination is made, the parties must
confront the practical problems of developing the proof. Making the
questionable assumption that the parties understand what proof the
various factors require, they must, at minimum, begin studying the law
of the foreign nation. Possibly, if the nation has antitrust laws, it will
also have some form of legislative history. If no antitrust laws exist, the
parties apparently must determine the significance of this absence; de-
termine the policy of the foreign nation; ascertain how the foreign na-
tion would react to its nationals or non-national residents being sued
under the United States antitrust laws; and determine the interests of
188 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
189 K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, at 448.
190 Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
19, Id. at 688.
192 "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
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the United States. The difficulty of such an analysis in the simplest
case of one foreign nation is considerable, but where numerous foreign
nations are involved, the complexity appears overwhelming.
A series of hypothetical examples may better illustrate the practi-
cal difficulties of a Timberlane analysis. Assume a defendant company
incorporated and having its principal place of business in a developing
nation that encourages, but does not compel, restraints of trade. A pri-
vate plaintiff sues the defendant under the Sherman Act for conspiring
with other corporations, which are residents of other developing na-
tions, to fix quantities and prices of a commodity exported to the
United States. How does the court determine the depth of the foreign
nation's interest? Is this one of the restraints encouraged by the devel-
oping nation? If so, how deeply does the foreign country support this
restraint? Assume that the foreign country files an amicus brief and
claims that it is deeply interested in this company and an action against
the company would greatly offend this nation. In the face of this strong
expression of concern, allowing the suit to go forward may do more to
hurt foreign harmony than if the comity question had never been
asked. To complicate matters further, assume the State Department
expresses great interest in fostering harmonious relations with this
country. If the court then decides not to apply the Sherman Act, it
would not be clear if it so decided out of the court's own determination
of comity to a foreign sovereign or out of deference to the executive
branch's conduct of foreign relations. To complete the confusion, as-
sume that the foreign companies were also sued, but the State Depart-
ment was not interested in improving relations with some of the host
countries of these other defendants. This scenario might result in one
corporation escaping liability while the others are held liable-even
though all the companies participated in the same restraint of trade.
As a second hypothetical example, assume that an advanced na-
tion with a well-developed system of trade regulation protests greatly
the United States extraterritorial assertion of the Sherman Act. It
would be tempting for the court to look at the reasons behind the pro-
test, but, according to Judge Choy, such an investigation would violate
the act of state doctrine. 194 How should the court balance this sincere
concern against the United States' interest? Once again, unless the
court agrees not to apply the Sherman Act, more harm than good may
be accomplished by introducing comity into the analysis.
Finally, assume hypothetically that a foreign nation's automobile
194 l7mberlane, 549 F.2d at 615 n.34.
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manufacturers voluntarily agree to restrain exports to the United
States, not only at the urging of their government, but also at the urging
of the United States government. How can the court assess the United
States interest? Is the executive branch's policy determinative, or is the
pro-competitive policy of the Sherman Act dominant? What if a con-
gressional committee also urged the restraints, but Congress as a whole
did not act on the matter?
These examples illustrate the great difficulty which a court must
face when it undertakes the Timberlane comity analysis. The goals of
Timberlane, moreover, do not actually require this complex analysis.
Did Timberlane Ask the Right Questions?
In order to determine whether the Timberlane factors are the most
useful for resolving the comity issue, the objectives which Timberlane
sought to accomplish must be identified. The theme of sensitivity to
foreign interests appeared frequently in the opinion. Judge Choy used
the phrase "comity and fairness" to highlight these concerns. 195 In ad-
dition, Judge Choy stated another objective of his extraterritoriality
analysis:
The act of state doctrine discussed earlier demonstrates that the judi-
ciary is sometimes cognizant of the possible foreign implications of its
action. Similar awareness should be extended to the general problems of
extraterritoriality. Such acuity is especially required in private suits, like
this one, for in these cases there is no opportunity for the executive branch
to weigh the foreign relations impact, nor any statement implicit in the
filing of the suit that that consideration has been outweighed. 196
Thus, the concern for the executive's conduct of foreign affairs, raised
in Sabbatino 97 and Alfred Dunhill,198 once again becomes relevant.
With regard to comity and fairness, the court is concerned with the
foreign nation's involvement and concern with the pending matter. 99
The court is not, however, questioning the validity of these interests.2 °°
Judge Choy explicitly stated this limitation:
[T]here is an important distinction between examining the validity of the
"public interests" which are involved in a sovereign policy decision
amounting to an "act of state" and evaluating the relative "interests"
which each state may have "in providing the means of adjudicating dis-
putes or claims that arise within its territory." Our "jurisdictional rule of
195 Id. at 613.
196 Id.
197 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
198 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
200 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615 n.34.
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reason" does not in any way require the court to question the "validity"
of "foreign law or policy." Rather, the legitimacy of each nation's interests
is assumed. It is merely the relative involvement and concern of each
state with the suit at hand that is to be evaluated in determining whether
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised by American, courts as a
matter of comity and fairness.
20 1
Such a limitation is appropriate in a comity context. Otherwise,
the court could be placed in the position of finding substantial involve-
ment and concern by a foreign nation, while holding that the court will
not recognize this concern because it is based on the "wrong" reasons.
Not only is this determination impermissible under the act of state doc-
trine,2" 2 but it would also stand comity on its head. If comity is the
goal, then the analysis must assume that each nation's interests are le-
gitimate. Thus, the court's objective is to determine the level of the
foreign nation's involvement and interest in the case, not whether the
interest and involvement are justified.20 3
Given a goal of determining the magnitude of the foreign nation's
concern, the most direct route might be to request an amicus brief from
the foreign nation,204 rather than attempting to divine this interest
through a complicated and confused analysis of the Timberlane factors.
If the foreign country is unwilling to file an amicus brief, then either the
Timberlane analysis could go forward or the court could presume that
201 Id. (emphasis added).
202 Id.
203 Id. This objective places a great burden on the court. For example, assume that a private
party urged the foreign government to take a very strong position protesting the extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act. If the court is not able to look behind the foreign state's interest
to determine its validity, then there is little protection against foreign private parties enlisting the
aid of their government to defeat the purposes of the Sherman Act. However, if a court allows this
investigation on the grounds that it is trying to determine the depth of the foreign government's
concern in the matter, then it is merely changing the label and is, nonetheless, viewing the legiti-
macy of the foreign nation's interest, especially if that nation filed an amicus brief in which it
expressed its concern. Such an investigation in the name of comity would probably decrease,
rather than increase, foreign harmony.
The question of analyzing the validity of an act of state has arisen in several cases. See, e.g.,
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 705-06 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 271-76 (1927); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358
(1909); Hunt v. Mobil Oil, 550 F.2d 68, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 904 (1977); Occidential
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 109-13 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aj#'dper
curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). See also B. HAWK, supra note
2, at 134-48.
204 A procedure for filing such an amicus brief already exists. In a diplomatic circular, dated
August 17, 1978, to Chiefs of Mission in Washington, the State Department requested that foreign
governments present their views directly to the United States courts by filing amicus curiae briefs,
thereby discontinuing the previous policy of the foreign governments' transmitting their views
through diplomatic notes. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 122, 124-25 (1979).
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the foreign nation's interest in this case is insignificant. °5 In the effort
to show respect for a foreign nation, the most efficient method for de-
termining a sovereign's interest is to approach the source, the foreign
nation itself.
Similarly, if Timberlane sought to protect the executive's freedom
to conduct foreign affairs, then the court should follow a path more
direct than the Timberlane analysis. As done prior to the passage of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the court could request a
suggestion from the State Department directly, 20 6 rather than have the
litigants and the court guess at what the State Department's position
would be.20 7
In this time of dramatic scarcity of judicial resources, compelling a
court to follow a test which takes an inefficient, indirect route to yield,
at best, highly uncertain answers is counterproductive when a far more
efficient and less wasteful method is available.
Is A Court the Appropriate Forum for Making the Comity
Determination?
In contrast to the judiciary's historic reluctance to address political
questions,0 8 the Timberlane analysis requires the courts to confront
political issues and perhaps even to create political questions where
otherwise they would not exist. Kingman Brewster recognized explic-
itly that the components of his jurisdictional rule of reason "are a re-
sponse to essentially political rather than economic and business
considerations."209 Consequently, the courts are obligated to seek out
the political issues as an initial step in the Sherman Act analysis, stand-
205 A test which is based on a foreign nation's filing a brief in a United States court may be
considered unreasonable in that it requires the foreign nation to respond in the judicial proceed-
ings of another sovereign. However, if the motivation of the United States court is to obtain
information in order to make a comity determination, then it may not be unreasonable to expect
the foreign government to exercise comity of its own and participate in the United States judicial
proceeding.
206 Precedent for this type of participation by the State Department may be found in the sover-
eign immunity cases prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. In
these cases, the State Department would file a suggestion as to whether immunity should be
granted. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
207 This approach may appear to contradict the congressional termination of the suggestion
procedure in the foreign sovereign immunity context. However, the uncertainty in the Sherman
Act extraterritoriality area is similar to the uncertainty in the immunity area prior to the enact-
ment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976. Consequently, unless Congress clarifies its
Sherman Act position, as it did in the immunity area with the Act of 1976, this suggestion proce-
dure seems to be sound.
208 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 100-11 (1978).
209 K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, at 446.
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mng many of the concepts underlying the political question doctrine on
their heads.
Unlike the traditional political question doctrine, where the sub-
ject matter of the cause of action is held inappropriate for judicial con-
sideration,"'0 the application of the Sherman Act in the international
context is justiciable because Congress expressly provided a foreign
commerce provision in the statute and, as historically interpreted, the
elements of the statute fell within matters of traditional judicial con-
cern. The Timberlane analysis, however, seems to require the court to
address issues which fall within the nonjusticiability criteria of the
political question doctrine. In Baker v. Carr, 2" ' the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the political question doctrine in detail,
stating:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discovera-
ble and manageable standardsfor resolving it; or the impossibility of decid-
ing without an initialpolicy determination of a kind clearly not for judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a polit-
ical decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
The Timberlane analysis raises questions under the three emphasized
factors from Baker v. Carr. The elements discussed in Timberlane are
neither easily discoverable nor manageable; the court is forced to make
an initial determination of the political policies of the United States
and foreign governments; and a court's pronouncements of these poli-
cies might embarrass the executive or legislative branches, when their
policy considerations differ from the court's finding.
D. Gordon Blair, a Justice of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court
of Ontario, explicitly questioned the judiciary's ability to make these
political determinations:
We have considerable apprehension about the Timberlane decision.
The Alcoa decision was understandable in basing extraterritorial inter-
vention on an assertion of fact that American commercial interests were
being interfered with. The Timberlane decision removes that safeguard
and plunges the American courts into the realm of diplomacy. I suppose
everybody else here is too polite to ask how it is that a judge . .. can
decide what is the proper balance of international interests .... I feel
210 J. NOWAI, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 208, at 100.
211 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
212 Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
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that this is not a good area for the judiciary.213
It is not the subject matter of the international application of the
Sherman Act which is nonjusticiable, therefore, rather it is that the
Timberlane analysis forces consideration of issues which are likely to
be nonjusticiable. By balancing the United States interest against a for-
eign government's interests, the court would have to make a political
decision even if these interests were clearly defined. Where these inter-
ests are undefined, the court must also analyze political factors in order
to determine the nature and weight of the respective interests. As a
result, the Timberlane analysis inevitably forces the courts to make
political judgments.
As presently formulated, the Timberlane analysis embroils the
courts in political issues ab initio, when confronting the jurisdictional
question. Whether the analysis can be modified to avoid unnecessary
judicial determinations of political issues while remaining loyal to the
objective of international comity, or, alternatively, whether the comity
analysis should be abandoned altogether in the Sherman Act context
now must be investigated.
TMBERLANE: MODIFICATION OR REJECTION
Modifying Timberlane
The subject matter jurisdiction analysis in Timberlane may be
modified to avoid unnecessary political determinations. Putting aside
whether the analysis is applied in the jurisdiction vel non context or the
abstention context, the comity investigation need not be undertaken
unless the potentially affected foreign government affirmatively ex-
presses an interest in the outcome of the case sufficient to exceed some
threshold level. This level might be the filing of an amicus brief in
which the foreign nation communicates the depth of its interest in the
pending matter.2 14 Once this threshold of concern is satisfied, the court
may decide to undertake a comity analysis.
This threshold test may be justified because, in a balancing of in-
terests analysis, the United States will always begin with an interest
which must be outweighed, namely, the congressional assessment that
competition is in the public interest. Consequently, if the foreign gov-
ernment is unwilling to express an interest in the case, then it may be
presumed, absent a sufficient showing to the contrary, that the defend-
213 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 67.
214 For the prescribed method to be used by a foreign government when filing an amicus, see
supra note 204.
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ant will not be able to establish a foreign government interest great
enough to outweigh this congressional statement.
If the foreign government does express an interest, the court need
not require that the analysis be further developed by the parties. Once
the foreign nation speaks, the court could request a brief from the State
Department in order to obtain the policy position of the executive
branch. This brief, however, should not be viewed as the dispositive
expression of the United States interests. Rather, it should be viewed
in conjunction with the pre-existing statement in the Sherman Act of
congressional interest in fostering competition. As a result, the State
Department response might either increase or decrease the United
States interest in applying the Sherman Act to the case at hand. If the
State Department chooses not to file a brief, the court could reasonably
conclude that State is indifferent in the matter.
Once the amicus briefs are filed, the court need not require input
from the parties as comity embraces the concerns of the sovereign
states; it transcends the interests of individual litigants. Perhaps the
plaintiff may be given the opportunity to argue the depth of the pro-
competitive interest, but neither party can actually add anything mean-
ingful to the political interest inquiry once the respective governments
have spoken. Consequently, after this information is communicated,
the court is ready to make its political determination. Although this
method does not relieve the court from ultimately making a political
judgment, it does remove from the court and the parties much of the
burden of developing and analyzing the political factors and political
analysis. And, if the foreign country does not satisfy the threshold test,
this method forecloses the political analysis entirely.
Rejecting Comity in the Subject Matter Jurisdiction Area
Another judicial alternative to Timberlane would be rejecting
comity as a factor in determining or exercising subject matter jurisdic-
tion, but applying the concept to other aspects of the case where the
judiciary has historically exercised discretion or spoken in terms of fair-
ness-specifically, the areas of personal jurisdiction, discovery, and
remedy.
The concept of personal jurisdiction is built around notions of fun-
damental fairness,215 and, consequently, judges are experienced in pur-
suing a fairness analysis in this context. In a matter involving sensitive
foreign relations questions, the court might increase the minimum con-
215 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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tacts hurdle out of a showing of comity and fairness toward the affected
foreign state., As in the subject matter jurisdiction area,216 it is not clear
what basis of authority the court could assert to justify this use of com-
ity. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to point out that
courts have considered fairness when conducting personal jurisdiction
analyses, and, consequently, this area is arguably more appropriate
than the subject matter area for considering concepts of international
comity and fairness. Interestingly, the Department of Justice, which
has commented favorably upon considering comity factors in the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction area,2 17 has taken a hard line in relation to per-
sonal jurisdiction. In its Antitrust Guidefor International Operations,
the Department stated that it will "seek to exercise the fullest permissi-
ble jurisdiction over those who cartelize our markets."2 8 Perhaps the
Justice Department should rethink its position given that comity con-
siderations are more appropriate in a context traditionally marked by a
fairness analysis.
The courts might also introduce comity considerations into the res-
olution of discovery disputes, an area in which the courts have already
exercised discretion in the international context.2 19 In SocietM Internati-
onale Pour Particpations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rog-
ers,220 the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, affirmed
by the Second Circuit, to dismiss the plaintifis complaint for failure to
comply with a discovery order even though compliance would have
exposed the plaintiff to criminal sanctions in Switzerland. The Court
called for a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a party acted in
good faith in its attempt to comply with a discovery order. If good
faith is found, then dismissal of the complaint is not warranted.221 As
to the plaintiff in the case, the Court stated:
The findings below, and what has been shown as to petitioner's ex-
tensive efforts at compliance, compel the conclusion on this record that
petitioner's failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production or-
der was due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by cir-
cumstances within its control .... Plaintiff asserts only its inability to
comply because of foreign law .... [W]e think that Rule 37 should not
216 See supra text accompanying notes 125-168.
217 THE GUIDE, supra note 15, at 6-7.
218 Id. at 8.
219 For a discussion of problems in the discovery area, see Ral, Enforcement and Discovery
Conflicts in Foreign Trade, in INTERNATIoNAL ANTrrRUST, FIFTH ANNUAL FoRDHAM CoRPO-
RATE INsTITUTE 343-57 (Hawk ed. 1980).
220 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
221 Id. at 211-12.
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be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint.
222
Although the Court's reasoning in SocietM revolved around fairness to
the litigant, its willingness to pursue such an analysis indicated flex-
ibility and discretion in resolving discovery disputes.
In In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litiga-
tion,223 the Tenth Circuit built upon SocietM and introduced notions of
the foreign government's interests, as well as fairness to the litigant,
when determining what should be done when a party fails to comply
with a discovery order.2 24 Rio Algom, a Delaware corporation doing
business in Utah, was ordered by the District Court to produce docu-
ments located in Canada. A Canadian regulation prohibited such dis-
closure. The court held Rio Algom in civil contempt for failing to
comply even though Rio Algom had unsuccessfully sought a waiver
from Canadian authorities.2 5 After applying the good faith analysis of
Societb, the Tenth Circuit stated:
In our view Societe holds that, though a local court has the power to
order a party to produce foreign documents despite the fact that such pro-
duction may subject the party to criminal sanctions in the foreign country,
still the fact of foreign illegality may prevent the imposition of sanctions
for subsequent disobedience to the discovery order. We also believe it to
be implicit in Societe that foreign illegality does not necessarily prevent a
local court from imposing sanctions when, due to the threat of prosecu-
tion in a foreign country, a party fails to comply with a valid discovery
order. In other words, Societe calls for a "balancing approach" on a case-
by-case basis. As this Court recently said ... ,' The dilemma is the ac-
commodation of the principles of the law of the forum with the concepts
of due process and international comity.
22 6
The court then cited Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) ofFor-
eign Relations Law as a guide for the elements to be considered in a
balancing of interests analysis.227 The court concluded:
We proceed now to a consideration of ... the interests of Canada
and the United States which place Rio Algom under contradictory de-
mands. The records which Westinghouse seeks to examine are physically
located in Canada. Such being the case, it would not seem unreasonable
that the Canadian Government should have something to say about how
those records will be made available to outsiders.
Canada has a legitimate interest in the disclosure of these documents
222 Id.
223 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
224 Id. at 997.
225 Id. at 994-97.
226 Id. at 997.
227 Id.
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and the district court erred in failing to consider such interest. There is
nothing to indicate that the district court conducted any balancing of in-
terests. . . . Such approach is not in accord with Societe.
228
Thus, the Tenth Circuit moved beyond the good faith analysis of
SocietM, and interpreted that case to require a balancing of interests on
a case-by-case basis, similar to the analysis in Timberlane.
A final area where the courts may readily consider comity factors
is in fashioning a remedy. In his concurring opinion in Mannington
Mils, 229 Judge Adams explicitly recognized this option. He stated that
problems in formulating relief should not enter the threshold jurisdic-
tional question, but rather should be addressed at a subsequent stage in
the litigation.230 The Southern District of New York exercised this dis-
cretion fourteen years earlier in the Swiss Watchmakers231 case, where
it fashioned a relief order providing that the parties would not be re-
quired to violate Swiss law. This discretionary flexibility can be ex-
panded to include considerations of international comity.
In conclusion, even if the courts reject the comity analysis in their
subject matter jurisdiction determinations, but they may continue to
give attention to notions of foreign harmony by applying comity in the
areas of personal jurisdiction, discovery, and remedy.
Congressional Options
Congress may take various paths if it should determine that the
negative aspects of enforcing the Sherman Act in the international con-
text are sufficiently great. The private right of action could be abol-
ished in cases with international elements or, alternatively, a private
right of action might be conditioned on a successful public action. In
addition, the treble damages remedy might be done away with in the
international sphere. Besides considering equal protection issues, Con-
gress should answer two questions before so amending the Sherman
Act. First, under what circumstances are these international context
limitations to be triggered? Second, how can these limitations be rec-
onciled with the economic rationale of the Sherman Act that competi-
tion provides the most efficient allocation and utilization of resources?
228 Id. at 998-99.
229 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
230 Id. at 1302.
231 United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352,
at 80,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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CONCLUSION
Timberlane and its progeny, although expressing the laudatory
goal of increasing foreign harmony, raise serious questions as to the
appropriateness and practical manageability of a comity analysis. The
authority for introducing comity considerations into a jurisdictional
analysis is questionable at best.23 2 Similarly, treating comity as a factor
in an abstention analysis diverges considerably from historic abstention
doctrines.23 3 Both Congress and the Supreme Court have moved away
from concepts of comity in the foreign sovereign immunity and act of
state areas.23 4 Additionally, the practical difficulties of pursuing the
comity analysis as expressed by Judge Choy may be insurmountable. 235
And finally, Timberlane forces the courts to enter the political
arena 23 -- a forum for which the courts are in-suited.
The Timberlane analysis should be rejected or, at a minimum, lim-
ited to application in appropriately justiciable areas. The Sherman
Act's foreign commerce provision can be enforced within the scope of a
traditional fact analysis. If this enforcement gives rise to problems in
the international sphere, then these difficulties are best handled by the
political branches of government, not the courts.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 31-57.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 169-207.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 208-213.
